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Abstract. This paper analyzes the design, refinement, and evolution of organizational 
policymaking processes, that is to say, organizational governance. Governance proce-
dures like other aspects of organization are refined through time to advance formeteur 
interests. Several mechanisms of evolution are explored in this paper. First, formal or-
ganizations have a beginning. They are founded.  As a consequence, governance tem-
plates initially tend to maximize formeteur control over their organizations. Second, for-
meteurs may subsequently revise the initial distribution of authority. There are often 
good reasons for formeteurs to exchange some of their initial authority for services and 
resources that advance organizational interests. Third, there are the constraints of survi-
vorship, which require an organization to attract sufficient resources to be self sustaining. 
This paper suggests that the results of these processes of refinement tend to be rule-
driven, divided governments, many of which will be based on the king and council tem-
plate. That template facilitates the emergence of relatively effective forms of organiza-
tional governance, because it can be adjusted at a large number of margins without 
changing the essential architecture of governance.  
 
I. Introduction 
Formal organizations are an invention, like the wheel and wedge, that are not found 
in nature. Like those other inventions, formal organizations have played many important 
roles in human history. And in a manner similar to the wheel and wedge, specific imple-
mentations of organizations have been refined through time as new problems have been 
confronted, new methods of production imagined, and successive generations of organ-
izers learned from previous ones. Indeed, much of what separates humanity from the 
animal kingdom can be attributed to organizations that intentionally coordinate human 
activities to create more than would be possible for the same individuals operating inde-
pendently of one another alone or in spontaneous groups. 
                                              
1This paper was written while a visiting fellow at the Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Econom-
ics, whose support is gratefully acknowledged. The present version of the paper benefited from sev-
eral helpful comments from Ulrich Witt and conversations with several of the institute faculty, while 
at the institute.  
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How such organizations are formed tends to be neglected by economists and politi-
cal scientists in order to focus on the properties of particular reward and recruitment sys-
tems or to analyze equilibrium properties of spontaneous orders, such as markets and po-
litical culture. How and why organizations improve through time has been neglected for 
similar reasons. Most mainstream work tends to be “middle run,” insofar as it assumes 
that the pool of existing organizations and services are “given,” rather than subjects of 
analysis. 
Unfortunately, by neglecting the founding and refinement of organizational designs, 
the resulting theories of economic and political organizations miss much that is impor-
tant about the nature of existing organizations and about how organizations change 
through time. Both the founders and subsequent leaders of organizations are continu-
ously engaged in efforts to improve the performance of their organizations and often do 
so by revising their organizations’ standing routines. If policymaking is the main task of 
an organization’s government, it can be argued that the “governance” literature in eco-
nomics addresses only a subset of those policies, namely those affecting reward and re-
cruiting systems. (See, for example, Williamson’s extensive work in this area.)  
It is the design, refinement, and evolution of organizational decisionmaking proce-
dures that is the main focus of the present paper. This paper begins by focusing on the 
origins of formal organizations. That formal organizations are intentionally founded has a 
number of implications that are important for the analysis. Organizations are normally 
founded by a small subset of their members. The person or persons that found organiza-
tions are called “formeteurs” in this paper and the other persons in their organizations 
are called “team members.” That organizations are founded by formeteurs, rather than 
team members, implies that organizations are designed to advance the purposes of for-
meteurs, rather than their members.  
One consequence of this is that decisionmaking authority within an organization 
tends to be initially distributed in a manner that maximizes formeteur control over their 
organization. In most cases, however, divided forms of governance tend to replace the 
initially authoritarian ones as market-like shifts of authority take place. For example, as 
developed below, it is often in a formeteur’s interest to trade and/or delegate some of 
his/her initial authority to others in exchange for services and resources that advance his 
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her organizational interests. Contemporary private firms often raise capital by selling off 
voting rights, and medieval kings often traded parliamentary authority for new taxes.  
This paper suggests that such divided governments are often based on the “king and 
council” template, because that template solves a variety of common governance prob-
lems. 
 The king and council template divides policymaking authority between a king (a 
chief executive officer, chief, king, president, etc.) with a council (board of directors, 
council of wise men, cabinet, parliament, etc.). Several of the reasons why the king and 
council template tends to be widely used are discussed in the middle sections of this pa-
per. Among the most important for the purposes of this paper is that the king and coun-
cil template can be easily adjusted through time, which allows it to be subjected to incre-
mental experiments, refinement, and improvement. Its many margins of adjustment allow 
it to be perfected gradually as a template for government in the long run. These same 
margins also allow it to serve as a very useful analytical framework for studying the evolu-
tion of organizational government.2  
The king and council template for organizational governance is extremely common. 
It is used by armies (commanding general and council of war), by religious organizations 
(pope and council of cardinals), by modern corporations (chief executive officer and 
board of directors), by primitive governments (chief and council of wise men) and by 
contemporary democratic governments (president or prime minister, and parliament). 
The arguments and models developed in this paper are extensions of work devel-
oped in part 1 of Perfecting Parliament (Congleton 2011). This paper differs from the book 
in that it focuses on the evolutionary possibilities of organizational governments in gen-
eral, rather than specific features of territorial governance and external shocks that al-
lowed liberal democracy to emerge in the nineteenth century. Several of the arguments 
presented briefly in this paper, however, are developed at greater length in the book, es-
pecially those dealing with territorial governance. 
                                              
2 Nelson and Winter (1982) launched the modern research program on evolutionary economics. See 
Witt (2006) for a nice overview of research and research issues in the work that followed their pio-
neering effort. Wohlgemuth (2002) provides a careful survey of issues and contributions to evolution-
ary theories of politics. However, the organizational governance (constitutional) issues focused on in 
this paper are not mentioned in such surveys. There are, for example, no discussions of the extent to 
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II.  The Origins and Evolution of Organizations 
In the days before histories were recorded, few distinctions existed between govern-
ments and other informal organizations. Both were evidently family and clan based. As 
agriculture emerged and people settled in particular places, the variety and size of organi-
zations and governments tended to increase. There were simply more activities that could 
benefit from organized team production. That more activities took place within formal 
organizations and within territories ruled by governments did not imply that all activities 
were organized from the top down, as in totalitarian states. Nor, did it imply that they 
were all organized in the same way. There are a variety of ways that organizations can be 
founded—by one, two, or many formeteurs—and many of the same activities may be 
undertaken by organizations with different decisionmaking procedures.  
As organized groups grew larger and more specialized, distinctions began to emerge 
between organizations that could impose rules only on their own members and those that 
could impose rules on persons outside their organizations during this time. This distinc-
tion between organizations did not imply that the internal decisionmaking procedures 
used by territorial governments were completely different from those used in other or-
ganizations. It simply meant that some organizations had opportunities that others did 
not. 
With such distant beginnings in mind, the paper analyzes the emergence and evolu-
tion of formal organizations. The analysis helps explain how and why ancient organiza-
tions provide the foundations for contemporary ones, although very few contemporary 
organizations are thousands of years old. The connection between ancient and contem-
porary organizations is not through the continuity of the organizations themselves, but 
rather, a consequence of the similarity of the problems faced by ancient and contempo-
rary organizations. It is the solutions to these problems that induce groups of persons to 
become “organizations,” rather than simply gatherings of uncoordinated persons, each 
doing their own thing. 
Both ancient and contemporary organizations are formed to advance goals that can 
best be achieved by coordinating the efforts of more than one person. The outputs of 
                                                                                                                                            
which a general evolutionary theory of organizational governance can be developed or applied to both 
private and political organizations.  
 4 
 #1009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
organizations normally take the form of (a) private goods produced with economies of 
scale over some range of inputs, (b) pure public goods available to all team members, or 
(c) services that can be more effectively distributed to others outside the organization 
through organized efforts.  
Both ancient and modern organizations have to make decisions that focus their re-
sources on particular activities and induce their team members to function as more or 
less productive teams, rather than as unproductive assemblies of individual shirkers and 
rent seekers. As a consequence, most organizations meet at particular times and places. 
Most use artificial incentive systems to address various team production problems. Most 
have particular persons whose decisions can focus the organization’s resources on par-
ticular tasks and change the manner in which those resources are used. The “leadership” 
of hunting clubs, farm cooperatives, churches, pirate ships, commercial enterprises, and 
territorial governments all select projects to undertake and provide internal incentives for 
undertaking them.  
Relatively durable organizations are also able to revise their objectives, reward sys-
tems, and procedures for making decisions as circumstances change. In this manner, a 
durable organization’s government may be said to evolve. And, insofar as the practices of 
organizations become known to others, one organization’s evolution may affect the 
standing routines of other existing organizations and others yet to be founded.  
III.  On the Requirements and Convergence of Reward Systems 
To understand some of the policy decisions made by a typical organizational gov-
ernment and the constraints under which an organization’s leadership operates, it is use-
ful to analyze the formation of a new organization. The first case analyzed can be thought 
of as that of the “first” formeteur, although it can be used to analyze a variety of prob-
lems that contemporary formeteurs have to overcome to create a viable organization. 
Section III focuses on the choice of reward and recruiting systems, which indirectly sheds 
a good deal of light on the nature of institutional design and rule making by organiza-
tional governments. Sections IV and V analyze the third core problem—that of govern-
ance. 
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A.  The Essential Economics of Rewards and Punishments 
Table 1 presents two game matrices. The game on the right is assumed to be a preex-
isting or natural game and the one on the right an artificial game contrived by a for-
meteur. The game on the left characterizes production in a “natural cooperative,” in 
which team members participate in a common venture (perhaps a hunt or harvest) and 
share the output produced. It is sensible for a player to participate in the cooperative’s 
activities, if he or she is better off in the cooperative than in alternative activities (exit), 
such as independent production by themselves (or in another cooperative).  
Note that the upper four cells of the left-hand game characterize a prisoner’s di-
lemma (PD) game and represent rewards from participating in the cooperative’s team 
production. These payoffs imply that team members choose to participate in the coop-
erative activities, rather than exit, but do not work as hard as required to maximize the 
cooperative’s output. In this sense, they “shirk,” rather than “work.” Nonetheless, the 
natural cooperative is viable, because, in equilibrium, each participant receives more than 
he or she would obtain by working alone (2 > 1.5). 
 
The Shirking Dilemma 
Game for Natural Cooperatives 
Table 1  
Organizational Solution  
to the Shirking Dilemma 
         
         
 Team Member B   Team Member B 
 Work Shirk Exit (B)   Work Shirk Exit (B) 
Work (A) 3, 3 1,4 1.5, 1.5  Work (A) R, R R, P 1.5, 1.5 
Shirk (A) 4, 1 2,2 1.5, 1.5  Shirk (A) P, R P, P 1.5, 1.5 
Exit (A) 1.5, 1,5 1.5, 1.5 1.5, 1.5  Exit (A) 1.5, 1.5 1.5, 1.5 1.5, 1.5 
 
The cell entries are utilities, the rank order of subjective payoffs for the team members (A, B).  
 
The fact that output is not maximized by the natural cooperative provides an oppor-
tunity for a “formeteur” (or group of formeteurs) to create a more formal organization 
with a more sophisticated reward structure. Such formeteurs may be members of the 
natural cooperative or outsiders that imagine both the possibility of greater production 
and a reward system to encourage greater effort by team members.  
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Team members in the “Organizational Game” on the right have the same strategy 
sets as in the natural cooperative (work, shirk, exit), but they confront a reward system 
that is designed to encourage “work.” The subjective reward for work is R and the payoff 
associated with shirking is P. The members of the formal organization will work to ad-
vance the organizational goals (here, maximize output) if R > P. This is made more likely, 
by disconnecting rewards from joint output. The reward in this game is conditioned only 
on individual effort, rather than on the performance of the organization as a whole. 
Exit options further constrain the values of R and P that formeteurs can choose. In-
dividuals will, for example, join the new team only if R is greater than 2, so that they are 
better off than at the natural cooperative. Punishment payoff P may also affect decisions 
to join or not. If punishments are imposed in an arbitrary or inaccurate manner, potential 
team members may fear that they may occasionally receive P < 2 even if they are working 
hard. They will be more likely to join and less likely to exit if they believe (expect) that 
only “shirkers” will be punished. Thus, R > 2 is sufficient to discourage exit only if the 
average level of rewards, including mistaken punishments, is greater at the new organiza-
tion than at the natural cooperative (adjusted for risk).  
B.  Choosing Specific Reward Systems 
The theory of organizational design sketched out above and used below rests on two 
assumptions. The first is that an organization’s formeteurs are able to create gamelike set-
tings in which they determine the (subjective) payoffs for team members. In the illustra-
tion above, they did so by creating conditional rewards for working and shirking. The 
second assumption is that formeteurs design their organizations with their own organiza-
tional objectives in mind, although they do not have sufficient knowledge to design the 
best possible organization.  
Of course, these two assumptions can be further subdivided into others. For exam-
ple, the assumption that a formeteur can create a game in which team members feel con-
strained to play by the rules essentially assumes that formeteurs can solve their reward 
and recruitment dilemmas. The specific methods required to do so will vary somewhat 
with the external setting, as developed below. This paper abstracts from associated is-
sues—such as conditional propensities to cooperate in structured settings or to defer to 
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organizational leaders—in order to focus on general features of the reward systems that 
emerge that have relevance for organizational governance.3  
It is often convenient to assume that formeteurs attempt to maximize organizational 
surplus. Organizational surplus can be thought of as profit or net resource flow to the 
organization. Such net flows can be used for a variety of purposes by formeteurs. Organ-
izational surplus may be used to provide capital for the organization or to provide a buf-
fer for unexpected negative shocks. It can be used to found other organizations, which 
may not be initially self-supporting. It can also be used to enhance the formeteur’s per-
sonal consumption or even given away to charity. The surplus itself may be realized in 
pecuniary terms (money or physical resources), subjectively appealing nonpecuniary ones 
(status, deference, or creative satisfaction), or various combinations of each.  
If formeteurs attempt to maximize organizational surplus, they will be inclined to 
adopt the least expensive reward systems that solves their team production problems. In 
many cases, several combinations of pecuniary and nonpecuniary rewards may elicit the 
behavior of interest. It bears noting that rewards in most organizations include status, 
praise, and prizes in addition to pecuniary rewards (salaries). Here, one may note the use 
of special badges and uniforms in military organizations to encourage extreme effort, sac-
rifice, and bravery. Similar nonpecuniary “perks” are also used to motivate team members 
of modern corporations and government officials, for whom the relative size of offices, 
company cars, parking place locations, and titles are used to indicate position in the intra-
organizational status hierarchy. It is also clear that punishments for shirking can also be 
multidimensional. 
                                              
3The assumption that formeteurs can affect subjective payoffs, R=u(Ro) and P=u(Po), is equivalent to 
assuming that formeteurs can raise and lower objective payoffs Ro and Po for their team members.  
In some settings, the formeteur may do so by directly producing resources that can be used to af-
fect Ro and Po, as when praise and criticism can affect their team members’ subjective welfare. In oth-
er cases, the formeteur may simply use the team’s output as a source of rewards and punishments. In 
such cases, the formeteur’s control over the team’s output may be itself a product of organization and 
team production. There may be specialized monitor-enforcer teams and/or the team’s output may be 
placed in a safe place controlled by the formeteur(s).  Formeteur control of team output may also be 
supported by widely accepted norms of deference to leaders or by other external sanctions. For exam-
ple, the organization may take place in a setting where civil law exists.  
It bears noting that I do not make the Hobbesian assumption about anarchy, as many do in this lit-
erature, which essentially rules out the formation of small teams in which organizational surplus can 
exist, absent leviathan. Rather, I assume that there are places where at least a few persons can escape 
from “the war of every man against every other.” Here, it bears noting that many animals have genetic 
predispositions to respect each other’s territory, rather than contest it at every moment. 
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C.  Culture and the Cost of Reward Systems 
Opportunities to use nonpecuniary rewards to address team production problems are 
partly culture dependent. For example, the local culture may include support for bravery, 
a work ethic, honesty, or rule-following behavior. Vanberg and Congleton (1992) suggest 
that propensities to cooperate (conditionally) have survivorship value in environments 
where exit is possible, and thus norms that help to induce cooperation tend to emerge in 
most societies. In such cases, formeteurs can economize on monitoring costs and en-
courage rule-following behavior by reminding team members of the merits of local 
norms and rewarding norm-driven behavior. Awards might be given to persons who 
never miss a day of work, are especially diligent, or are especially loyal to the organiza-
tion.  
Formeteurs may also attempt to create stronger versions of local norms or their own 
norms, an “organizational culture,” by encouraging hard work, loyalty, and useful innova-
tion in various ways. When an organizational culture is successful, it may indirectly affect 
the local external culture. Team members may take their organizational norms home with 
them, apply them to other parts of life and teach them to their children. Efforts to recruit 
persons that have already internalized the organization’s norms also encourages unaffili-
ated persons in the community to adopt those norms. 
Composite reward systems make sense whenever they can solve the incentive prob-
lems of team production at a lower cost than an entirely pecuniary system of rewards and 
punishments. Instances of composite systems of such rewards are most obvious in mili-
tary and religious organizations, but also occur in governments, private clubs, and con-
temporary corporations. Indeed, the latter often copy ideas from military and religious 
organizations and have their own rituals and medals of honor. 
The problem of motivating team members can also be reduced through various re-
cruiting methods. Some people have goals, world views, and norms that are more “natu-
rally” aligned with the goals of a particular organization. Such persons are especially valu-
able for organizations, when they are available, and will be recruited while others whose 
norms are counterproductive will be discouraged from membership. For example, for-
meteurs may attempt to attract members who are easy to motivate or demonstrate that 
they have “internalized” useful norms, such as rule-following behavior or a work ethic. 
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For example, in table 1 the punishment may be purposely set at P < 2, so that per-
sons who are difficult to motivate (natural “shirkers”) remain at the natural cooperative, 
instead of joining the new organization. Churches thus recruit believers, rather than athe-
ists, for their organizational bureaucracies. Military organizations similarly recruit those 
who accept the necessity of violence, rather than pacifists. Governments normally recruit 
persons who signal loyalty to their organizations, rather than dissidents or persons from 
abroad. Commercial firms are inclined to hire those who indicate their interest in high 
incomes or being “team players,” rather than stubborn idealists or individualists, unless 
the latter clearly have interests that are well aligned with the organization’s objectives. 
Other directly productive skills also matter, as emphasized by educators and economists, 
but they are not necessarily the most important type of human capital for determining a 
person’s productivity on a given team. 
D. Exit as a Constraint on Organizational Reward Systems 
As noted above, there are limits to a formeteur’s ability to manufacture a cooperative 
culture, and limits to the extent to which intrinsic motivation can be used to solve team 
production problems. There is also competition among formeteurs for tractable team 
members, which tends to increase exit options for such persons. Such constraints limit 
the extent to which surplus can be extracted by formeteurs. Although the reward systems 
chosen by formeteurs will attempt to minimize the compensation paid to team members, 
the reward-penalty system must be sufficient to attract and retain team members and 
solve the team production problems.  
In the illustration above, the formeteur might pay team members R = 2.1 for work 
and P = 1.6 if they are found to be shirking. The team production equilibrium in this case 
is (work, work) and the organization’s total output is 6. The total cost of the reward sys-
tem will be 2 x 2.1 = 4.4 and the organizational surplus is 6 – 4.2 = 1.8 (less a small 
amount for accurate monitoring of work effort). If team-member exit options improve 
from 2 to 2.5, a reward such as R = 2.6, becomes necessary and organizational surplus 
falls to 6 – 5.2 = 0.8. 
In the absence of exit options, severe punishments might be used to encourage “co-
operation.” For example, given an R sufficient for the survival of a team member, any P 
< R below that will induce cooperation if there are not exit options. Evidently, the sys-
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tems used to motivate slaves were often centered on punishments, rather than rewards. 
The exit options of slave were often very limited, because they were limited by law as well 
as by their masters. If imposing such punishments is less costly than providing work-
inducing rewards, formateurs will be inclined to use penalties, rather than rewards to en-
courage productive effort. 
Note also that the cost of a reward-and-punishment system is also affected by arbi-
trariness and/or error rates. The greater the error rate or arbitrariness of the punish-
ments, the higher average rewards must be to attract and retain team members. The rules 
for rewarding and punishing team members for working and shirking should be (rela-
tively) stable through time, because this reduces uncertainty among team members and 
thereby the total compensation required to attract and retain team members.4  
In general, formeteurs maximize their organizational surplus by choosing the least 
expensive composite reward system that solves both their team production and recruit-
ment problems. Perhaps surprisingly, minimizing the cost of effective reward systems 
implies that formeteurs will rely on and may reinforce social norms and that they will not 
create or enforce rules arbitrarily. Both formeteur and team member interests are ad-
vanced by organizations with stable, predictable systems of reward and punishment.  
Insofar as evolution favors organizations with relatively larger organizational sur-
pluses, evolution can also be said to favor organizations with their own internal rule of law. 
E. The Evolution, Convergence, and Stability of Conditional Reward Systems 
The first formeteurs have to imagine their entire reward systems, which consequently 
are likely to be very simple ones based on physical “carrots,” “sticks,” family loyalty, and 
deference to authority figures. The next formeteur(s) will be able to observe the successes 
and failures of the first, and copy practices that work and revise (slightly) those that did 
not. Not all reward systems will work equally well at solving team production problems 
or advancing formeteur interests.  
Subsequent generations of formeteurs will focus their attention on reward and re-
cruiting systems used by more or less successful organizations from previous generations. 
                                              
4 If Ne =f*u(R o) + (1-f) u(Po) is the expected net reward, where f is the probability of being wrong-
fully punished, and Ro and Po are objective rewards with subjective values R=u(Ro) and P=u(Po) re-
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As time passes, the systems adopted reflect the experience and experiments of more and 
more formeteurs, whose organizations would have advanced a variety of goals in a variety 
of circumstances. As a consequence, the reward and recruiting systems used tend to be-
come more effective through time, in the sense that they increase organizational surplus. 
The latter is often a consequence of the use of larger teams, which become more produc-
tive as reward and recruitment systems improve. Such long-term improvements reflect 
the insights and experience of many generations of formeteurs, about whom most of the 
current generation of formeteurs (and other organizational leaders) are likely to be en-
tirely ignorant.  
The common problems and interests of formeteurs imply that very similar solutions 
to intra-firm incentive and governance problems tend to be widely used in culturally and 
commercially linked regions and applied for long periods. By using a preexisting template 
for their reward and recruiting systems, formeteurs can economize on their own analysis 
of reward and recruiting systems and reduce the risk that their organizations will fail to 
solve specific team production problems in a cost-effective manner. The use of proven 
“off the shelf” reward and recruiting systems also allows formeteurs to form new organi-
zations more rapidly and to focus more of their attention on other issues that affect the 
viability of their organization. 
The use of such “templates” has several implications of interest for the purposes of 
this paper. When formeteurs adopt templates from other organizations, they are implic-
itly acknowledging their limits as organizational designers and also the partly unknown or 
“spontaneous” nature of their productive internal organizational cultures. Once for-
meteurs acknowledge their limitations as institutional designers, they have additional rea-
sons to be conservative in their selection of reward systems and their subsequent experi-
ments to improve them.  
The unanalyzed and unknown aspects of their reward and recruiting systems imply 
that there are risks to experimenting with the templates adopted. The various compo-
nents of reward systems may not be entirely independent of one another; consequently, 
adjusting even one parameter in a plausible manner may produce unexpected results. The 
                                                                                                                                            
spectively, then f = 0 allows total rewards to be smaller than f>0, whenever function u is strictly con-
cave and monotone increasing in Ro and Po.  
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evidence surveyed by Frey and Jegen (2001), for example, suggests that increases in ex-
plicitly conditional forms of motivation tend to reduce (crowd out) self-motivation and 
so, surprisingly, may reduce productivity, rather than increase it. In this manner, “rational 
institutional conservatism” tends to increase both the convergence of reward and recruit-
ing systems and their stability. 
The similarity and stability of reward systems in a given time and place do not imply 
that every formeteur regards his or her organizational form to be the best that can be im-
agined or that formeteurs are extremely risk averse. Nor does convergence imply that the 
results are necessarily socially optimal in some sense. For example, excessive conserva-
tism may be induced by a PD-like social dilemma that increases the stability of prevailing 
practices beyond optimal levels. Individual formeteurs may not be able independently to 
adopt practices that are more “efficient” without losing team members or customers to 
their more conventional rivals, even though all formeteurs and team members would be 
better off with revised practices. 
With or without such social dilemmas, however, it remains the case that formeteurs 
adopt the most cost-effective reward systems that are known and feasible for them and 
that considerable convergence among reward systems and production methods tends to 
take place. Pear-harvesting coops will use similar ladders and baskets and use similar 
combinations of status, fruit, and wages to encourage pears to be picked. Fishing clubs 
will use similar nets to catch similar fish in similar places and reward their fishermen in a 
similar manner. 
Stable, widely used systems of rewards imply that the anticipated cost of significant 
reforms exceeds their benefits for formeteurs, given prevailing practices and norms in the 
communities in which their organizations operate. This is not to say that experimentation 
stops taking place, but that improvements become increasingly unlikely. Here, one may 
note that the basic technologies and organizational strategies for produce sellers and 
churches often appear to be stable for hundreds of years at a time.  
When new technologies are occasionally discovered, however, a variety of beliefs 
(subjective probabilities) about potential opportunities for improving existing methods of 
team production and organization are often affected. New technologies often “imply” 
that a variety of technological and organizational experiments are likely to increase organ-
izational surplus. Some of these hypotheses will prove correct, and successful experi-
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ments will be copied by other organizations and applied in new ones. In this manner, ad-
vances in organizational design tend to be pushed along by innovations in other tech-
nologies, as well as by innovations in reward and recruitment systems that concentrate 
additional organizational surplus in the hands of formeteurs. 
F. A Digression on the Nature of Formeteurs 
The persons that found a formal organization have been called “formeteurs” in this 
paper, rather than entrepreneurs or founders, for several reasons. Formeteurs have many 
of the same characteristics emphasized by the foundational texts on economic entrepre-
neurship. In Schumpeter’s (1934) and Kirzner’s (1978) terms, a formeteur has, creates, or 
recognizes organizational opportunities that others do not have or cannot see. Conse-
quently, “innovation,” “foresight,” “creativity,” and “boldness” are often associated with 
organizational leadership along with exceptional ability to recruit and motivate a team. 
Formeteurs may also be said to be less risk averse than others (Knight 1921), in that they 
are more willing to accept the risks associated with launching new enterprises. For-
meteurs, however, differ from the entrepreneurs of classic economic analysis, because 
they form organizations, rather than engage in price arbitrage or create new products. More-
over, the organizations founded may advance noncommercial purposes, rather than or in 
addition to commercial ones.  
Formeteurs also share a number of characteristics with “founders,” in that they are 
present at the founding of their organizations. However, not all founders are actively in-
volved in forming new organizations. They may simply be present at the beginning, ra-
ther than actively engaged in designing the organization. Many founders may thus lack 
leadership skills or entrepreneurial talents. 
That a formeteur has to solve a variety of team-production problems also has impli-
cations about the nature of the persons who tend to be formeteurs. Formeteurs cannot 
be “loners.” They tend to have unusual motivational skills and organizational insight. 
Leadership skills often include a relatively large informational base and the ability to per-
suade others that it is in their interest to defer to the formeteur’s direction. Formeteurs 
also tend to be relatively charismatic people who can induce persons to follow their direc-
tion at relatively low cost. Such talents allow formeteurs to influence both technological 
and cultural developments within their organizations, although they cannot fully control 
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them. Their influence over team members, however, is sufficient to allow them to use 
relatively inexpensive motivational systems, as, for example, various nonpecuniary re-
wards are substituted for relatively more expensive (or less effective) pecuniary rewards.5 
Formeteurs are not omniscient, nor are they necessarily geniuses in the usual sense of 
the word, although they tend to have an unusual ability to see organizational opportuni-
ties and to motivate people. Many, perhaps most, new organizations fail, which implies 
that formeteur insight and abilities to solve organizational problems tend to be quite im-
perfect. Formeteurs simply have a comparative advantage at forming new organizations. 
They can start new organizations at a relatively lower cost than non-formeteurs. 
IV.  Organizational Governance and the King and Council Template 
Having established a number of properties of organizational reward and recruiting 
systems, we now turn to the problem of organizational decisionmaking. It bears noting 
that organizational decisionmaking in all but the smallest organizations is normally under-
taken by specialized teams, so many of the conclusions reached about reward and recruit-
ing systems for “ordinary” team production also apply to “leadership” teams with re-
sponsibility for making organizationwide policy decisions.  
Teams will be used to make organizationwide decisions, whenever teams can do so 
better than individuals and team production problems can be solved. In such cases, there 
will be standing reward systems for persons holding leadership posts that align their in-
terests with those of the organization. The reward systems will often be composite ones 
that combine pecuniary and nonpecuniary rewards. The mechanisms used to recruit per-
sons to such teams will take account of both managerial talent and the ease with which 
such persons can be motivated to “work,” rather than “shirk” at their positions in the 
organizational government.  
The initial reward and recruiting systems for leadership posts will normally be chosen 
by formeteurs, and there will be a tendency for formeteurs to use time-proven templates 
for governance and for those templates to converge through time. The decisionmaking 
systems themselves are also likely to be rule based and relatively stable through time, but 
will be adjusted as relevant technologies and theories change. 
                                              
5 Witt (1997, 1998) makes similar points about entrepreneurs, whom, he notes, need firms as well as 
good ideas and who often use nonpecuniary means to motivate their team members. 
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However, there are a number of differences between leadership teams (organiza-
tional governments) and ordinary teams within an organization. One obvious distinction 
is that the “output” of the leadership team is largely the organization itself, rather than a 
service or product to be sold or an idea to be disseminated to outsiders. Another is that 
formeteurs often play a more central role in the governing decisions of their organiza-
tions than in day-to-day production. Another destinction of particular relevance for the 
purposes of this paper is that the problems of organizational governance tend to be more 
similar than the specific problems of team production that organizations confront, and so 
governing institutions tend to be more similar than other production methods. 
A.  Why Every Durable Organization Needs and Has a Government 
If circumstances inside and outside the organization were entirely stable, it is possible 
that a well-adapted reward and recruiting system would simply be left in place to “run” 
without active monitoring and review by an organizational government. However, cir-
cumstances are never completely stable, and no reward or recruiting system works equally 
well in all circumstances. As a consequence, organizations benefit from being able to 
adapt to changes in circumstances, which is often necessary if they are to survive in the 
long run. Clearly, A fishing club that continues fishing at the same pond after all the fish 
are gone would disappear as its members starve or leave for clubs that actually catch fish. 
Similarly, a cherry picking firm that continues to focus on the same grove after it is weak-
ened by disease or insects, rather than turn to other groves or other fruit, would disinte-
grate as members leave to find more fruitful firms with higher wages, whether in kind or 
cash. 
To adapt to changing circumstances, an organization must have routines for revising 
its objectives, methods of production, reward system, and recruiting system. To do so 
reliably normally requires a standing group of persons with a standing set of procedures 
for gathering information, evaluating alternatives, and making policy decisions. That is to 
say, it normally requires an organizational government. 
To the extent that an organization’s decisionmaking procedures are stable, an organi-
zation may be said to have a constitution. An organizational constitution is the collection 
of formal and informal standing procedures for making policy decisions. (An organiza-
tion’s constitution can be said to be the rules for making an organization’s rules.) Consti-
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tutions in this sense are not usually social contracts, nor are they always written down. 
Moreover, an organization’s constitutions are not usually the product of a grand constitu-
tional convention in which all of an organization’s members are represented. Rather, an 
organization’s initial procedures for policymaking are normally adopted by an organiza-
tion’s formeteurs. 
Formeteurs normally select their organizational governments from a menu of preex-
isting constitutional templates that are believed to work well, in the sense that they in-
crease the organization’s survival prospects and the risk-adjusted organizational surplus 
available to organizational leaders. Organizational governments do so by appropriately 
revising standing routines and objectives to take account of new internal and external cir-
cumstances. Only governmental templates that do so reasonably well tend to survive in 
the long run. 
As in other aspects of organizational design, the procedures of governance may also 
have to be adjusted from time to time as circumstances change. It is this that gives organ-
izational governance an evolutionary character at both the level of a single organization 
and as a social phenomenon. An organizational constitution is not carved in stone, be-
cause there are benefits associated with flexibility in governance. 
B. The Informational Advantages of the King and Council Template  
Many of the problems associated with devising an organizational government are 
similar across organizations, as noted above. The similarities allow the experience of ear-
lier organizations to be used to inform decisions of later ones. The same logic applies to 
organizational governance. If successful organizations use similar arrangements for mak-
ing their policy decisions, this will be recognized, and formeteurs will tend to adopt simi-
lar institutions for their new organizations. They will do so for many of the same reasons 
that they tend to use preexisting templates for reward and recruiting systems. Proven 
templates for governance reduce the risk of failure and the time necessary to establish a 
new organization.  
The next four subsections of this paper argue that the king and council template for 
governance is one such template. The analysis begins by pointing out the informational 
advantages of this template and then discusses how the king and council template can be 
used to solve other medium- and long-term problems: to address succession problems as 
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an institution for trading authority inside and outside the organization and as a method 
for reducing losses from conflict.  
C. Natural Governments for Organizations 
Perhaps the most “natural” form of organizational governance is the one (implicitly) 
assumed by most economists and also by many political theorists. Formeteurs may simply 
retain their initial authority to make and revise all major policy decisions after their or-
ganizations are up and running. A single individual may initially retain complete control 
over an organization’s policies in cases in which an organization is founded by a single 
formeteur. In cases in which a small group of formeteurs founds an organization, a ruling 
committee or council may retain control over the organization’s policies.  
Such “authoritarian” decisionmaking procedures have many advantages for for-
meteurs and their organizations. Formeteurs often have a superior understanding of or-
ganizational possibilities, which justifies their initial investment of time and attention to 
assemble a team and devise methods to advance particular goals. Formeteurs know their 
own goals better than others and are likely to have leadership skills that allow them to 
form and motivate groups at lower costs than others.  
As organizations increase in size, however, informational, resource, and design prob-
lems become more complex. For example, an organization’s conditional reward structure 
may require a good deal of monitoring of team member performance. New teams may be 
added and others eliminated or merged into others. The external circumstances may 
change in unpredicted ways and require the organization’s goals and/or conditional re-
ward system to be revised. Exit options for some team members may rise while others 
fall.  
To assist in gathering information and evaluating alternatives, formeteurs will often 
find it useful to assemble a team of “advisors,” who specialize in monitoring internal and 
external events that may affect the organization’s surplus. Unfortunately for formeteurs, 
simply assembling a team of advisors does not automatically improve the quality of or-
ganizational decisions. 
Formeteurs usually confront what Wintrobe (2000) calls the “dictator’s dilemma.” It 
is often in the interest of “advisors” simply to tell a dictator what he or she wants and/or 
expects to hear, especially when the dictator has complete control over organizational 
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rewards. In such cases, an in-house council of advisors would not add much to an au-
thoritarian organizational government’s stock of information or improve its decisions. 
Indeed, it may worsen those decisions by making the organization’s leadership over con-
fident. 
 D. Solving the Dictator’s Dilemma 
To address the dictator’s informational dilemma requires somewhat more sophisti-
cated institutions for “advice production.” To advance informational goals and reduce 
bias, formeteurs will often use committees of various types, the most important of which 
will play both direct and indirect roles in the policy decisions of their organizations. The 
members of those committees will tend to have expertise on matters of organizational 
interest and represent diverse interests.  
To enhance the value of the information passed on to the formeteur(s), the commit-
tee may be advised to use majority rule to choose policy recommendations and to make 
“consensus” forecasts about the consequences of policies. Under majority rule, median 
voter outcomes tend to emerge, and in the context of an advisory committee, the median 
member’s advice can be thought of as a median estimator. Median estimators tend to be 
relatively robust and unbiased estimators. Condorcet’s jury theorem relies, implicitly, on 
the estimation properties of median estimators (Congleton 2007). 
To motivate the committee, it is often useful to delegate some genuine decisionmak-
ing authority to them. This makes them partly responsible for the result, making it easier 
to punish mistakes and reward insightful decisions. (A mere advisor can simply provide a 
balanced list of pros and cons in order to shift responsibility to the formeteur.) Authority 
is also a good that many people value for its own sake. Even limited authority may in-
crease a person’s status or have reputational effects that increase the value of his or her 
information services to others. The latter may produce opportunities for consulting, and 
even limited policymaking authority may produce opportunities to profit from the efforts 
of rent seekers. In addition, delegating some authority to the advisory committee tends to 
free formeteur time and attention for other tasks, such as long-run planning, forming of 
new organizations, and liesure. In this manner, a divided form of the king and council 
template tends to emerge from initially authoritarian regimes. 
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Similar, but slightly different, informational advantages can also induce councils of 
formeteurs to employ “kings” (chief executive officers) and delegate some authority to 
them. A formeteur council has a variety of informational advantages over a single for-
meteur. For example, the formeteurs can pool information and average their individual 
estimates to create an accurate consensus forecast. However, members of the council 
may also free ride on information, analysis, and decisionmaking calculus. Council mem-
bers receive only part of the benefits from better management decisions, but all the cost 
for their own efforts to improve the decision.  
Appointing a chief executive officer (CEO) can improve intra-organizational moni-
toring by reducing free-rider problems associated with monitoring; it can also improve 
day-to-day policymaking by reducing other informational and analytical free riding and 
various decision costs. This frees time for formeteurs to focus on other matters.  
E. Succession and the King and Council Template 
Overall, the above suggests that informational advantages provide sufficient reasons 
for “kings” to have “councils” and for “councils” to have “kings.” It also suggests that 
informational advantages can sometimes be realized by shifting authority from the for-
meteurs to their advisors, managers, or persons initially outside of the organization. 
There are also noninformational reasons to use the king and council template and for 
formeteurs to shift part of their initial authority to others. The king and council template 
includes a large number of parameters that can be adjusted at the margin to address 
short, medium, and long run governance problems. Many of these affect the distribution 
or nature of policymaking authority. 
For example, the king and council template provides a number of useful methods for 
solving succession problems. Every durable organization will eventually outlive its for-
meteurs. Organizations that do not systematically replace their leaders may flounder be-
cause of as formeteur competence declines with age, or may disappear as policymaking is 
disrupted and internal infighting for leadership posts consumes the organization’s surplus 
after the formeteur departs. A systematic method for replacing successive generations of 
leaders tends to increase an organization’s long-run survival prospects, because effective 
governance contributes to an organization’s survival. 
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The king and council template provides a number of possible systematic ways for 
successive generations of organizational leaders to be replaced. Replacements for the un-
expected departure of a king may be selected by the council. Similarly, unexpected depar-
tures of council members can be selected by the king and/or surviving council members. 
Such choices tend to be fairly good ones, because surviving council members normally 
have the long-term interests of the organization in mind and are relatively well informed 
about the qualities required for good decisionmaking at the council level. Moreover, it is 
unlikely that both the king and the council will simultaneously disappear in an unexpected 
manner, although the king or individual members of the council may do so. 
To the extent possible, productive forms of competition for seats in the organiza-
tion’s government might also be encouraged. Council seats may, for example, be reserved 
for persons that have provided extraordinary service to the king or kingdom. Challenging 
examinations on matters relevant for councilor or royal duties can also be contrived.6  
In large organizations, king and council templates may be used to delegate authority 
for specific production activities within the organization. The latter can create a divided, 
hierarchical, organizational government with many areas of limited specialized authority 
to make policy decisions. The same hierarchy can be used to assess loyalty and talent for 
making policy decisions and to induce productive forms of competition among persons 
at similar levels within the organization for promotion to higher ones. 
Such contests can serve as indirect “auctions” for future seats in government that al-
low the current generation of leaders to extract surplus (rents) from the next one. Such 
contests, perhaps surprisingly, provide the current generation of officials with a good rea-
son to “care” about their organization’s long-term success. The next generation of leaders 
will “pay” more for leadership posts in successful organizations than in ones that appear 
doomed to failure. 
In cases in which it is not possible to constrain rivals for high office to “play by the 
rules,” other possibilities also exist. For example, some of the positions in government 
may be deemed inheritable, which tends to reduce unproductive conflict at times of suc-
cession. Such rights might also be subject to the veto of other parts of the government. 
                                              
6Unfortunately, it is often difficult to encourage all rivals for high office to play by the rules devised. 
Such problems can be reduced by imposing severe punishments on those that violate the rules of suc-
cessional contests.  
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For example, the persons holding positions in the council or as king may be able to pass 
their positions along to their children (hereditary succession), unless vetoed by a super-
majority of council members (and/or the king). Such compound systems also reduce 
conflict, because they reduce the number of potential successors, and also help avoid 
negative genetic shocks. 
 F. The King and Council Template and Markets for Authority 
Methods for choosing successors are only one of many continua along which ad-
justments to the king and council template can be made. Other important institutional 
continua involve the division of authority between the king and council and among 
council members.  
“Power” (policymaking authority) is often represented as if it were a single lexico-
graphic dimension, in which case, peaceful shifts of authority would be impossible; but 
policymaking authority is in fact multidimensional and most persons are less attached to 
power than implied by those who employ lexicographic representations of the demand 
for authority. As a consequence, shifts of policymaking authority often take place, as au-
thority is traded within the leadership team or between the leadership team and others 
inside and outside their organization. Such trades are possible, because a stable distribu-
tion of policymaking authority creates political property rights that can be bought and 
sold much like control over ordinary goods and services. 7 
Although a founding formeteur or council of formeteurs usually holds onto most of 
his or its authority in the early days of an organization, many intermediate divisions of 
authority are also possible; these can often be used to increase organizational surplus. In 
many cases, an organization’s leadership will find that the benefits from additional re-
sources exceed the losses from reduced control of “their” organizations. Many of these 
“constitutional bargains” can be implemented using the king and council template. 
 
 
                                              
7It bears noting that exchanges in ordinary private markets can be thought of as changes in the distri-
bution of authority. When person A trades person B some X for Y, A gives up his authority over X in 
exchange for new authority over Y, and B receives new authority over X in exchange for giving up 
authority over Y. 
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 G.  Constitutional Gains to Trade 
Table 2 illustrates a pattern of risk and reward that can induce authority-sharing bar-
gains in which new persons are brought into an organization’s government or at least into 
positions where they can systematically influence organizational decisions.  
 
Table 2 
 Mutual Gains from Sharing Authority  
 
    
 
Organizational Leadership 
   No 
Authority 
Shared 
Authority 
Complete 
Authority 
  
 
Complete  
Authority 8, 10 – – 
Potential 
Team Member 
Shared  
Authority – 10, 12 – 
 
  
No  
Authority – – 6, 14  
 
The initial state is the one characterized by the upper left-hand cell of table 2 in 
which a resource of interest to the formeteur(s) is entirely controlled by a non–team 
member. The organization’s leadership is better off if it obtains complete control over 
that person’s (or group’s) resources, than if it obtains shared or no control (14 > 12 > 
10). The prospective team member is better off with shared control than with complete 
or no control. Retaining complete control requires sacrificing advantages from team pro-
duction, while giving up complete control places his or her resources at greater risk than 
under shared control (10 > 8 > 6). In cases like the one illustrated, there are gains to 
trade, but realizing them may require sharing policymaking authority in at least a narrow 
range of the organization’s activities. 
Many such cases involve risks associated with temporary transfers of control over a 
resource. For example, prospective cherry pickers who are especially adept at climbing 
trees or own ladders may fear that their talents or ladders will be abused by the organiza-
tion’s leadership. Such temporary members and their ladders may always be assigned to 
the most dangerous trees. Such persons would be more willing to participate in the an-
nual harvest, if they have some veto authority over the trees to which they are assigned. 
Their risks (broken legs and ladders) can be reduced by “giving” them limited veto power 
over the use of their ladders and/or assignments to particular treetops.  
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Similarly, a regional government that confronts an external threat from pirates or 
neighboring navies may benefit from the use of commercial ships in defense of their ter-
ritory. The owners of commercial ships, however, may be unwilling to allow their ships 
to be under the command of the regional government. They might fear, for example, that 
the government would assign their ships to the most dangerous missions, while holding 
the government’s own ships in reserve. Granting the commercial ship owners some au-
thority to veto or at least influence how their ships will be used may make them more 
willing to allow their ships to be used for regional defense, benefiting both the kingdom 
and the ship owners. 
Entrepreneurs of commercial organizations engage in similar transactions when they 
sell shares of stock (as in an initial public offering [IPO]) to investors, who provide capi-
tal in exchange for claims against future profits and some control (voting rights) over ma-
jor firm decisions. In this manner, those founding the firm often voluntarily transfer 
some (but not all) authority to shareholders and/or to a council elected by the new 
shareholders (board of directors). How much authority is transferred depends partly on 
risk assessments of capital owners, which determines their demand for control. High de-
mands for authority by potential shareholders tends to increase both the scope of voting 
rights and how many seats on the board of directors are allocated to members elected by 
shareholders.  
Similarly, the medieval kings of Europe often traded (sold) policymaking authority to 
parliaments and towns in exchange for new tax revenues. In some cases, new seats in par-
liament or in ministries were created and directly or indirectly sold to those with an inter-
est in public policy decisions. In others, authority was simply shifted from the king to the 
council or from the council to the king in exchange for other services or privileges. Many 
such transactions took place between European kings and parliaments in the period be-
tween 1400 and 1900, as parliaments traded new taxes for new policymaking authority 
(Congleton 2011: Part II).  
In none of the above cases are threats of violence necessary for shifts of authority 
(power) to take place. However, it must be acknowledged that threats of violence can al-
so induce shifts in authority. 
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 H.  The King and Council Template Can Be Used to Reduce Unproductive 
Conflict 
A related, but somewhat different, case occurs in settings in which two or more par-
ties struggle to control a given resource. Again, there may be constitutional gains to trade, 
and, again, the king and council template may be adopted or modified as a means of re-
ducing losses from inter- or intra-polity conflict.  
Table 3 illustrates a contest in which resources are invested in such a contest. Re-
sources are wasted in this contest, because the joint payoffs fall as conflict intensifies. 
Conflict in such cases reduces the extent to which the contested resources can be used 
for productive purposes or consumes resources taken from other more productive activi-
ties. The Nash equilibrium is wasteful, because the total output (which can be regarded in 
objective terms in this case) are lower than they would have been with less intense con-
flict. As in the previous cases, unrealized potential gains can be realized through im-
proved institutional design. 
 Table 3: Asymmetric Conflict 
  Stronger Party  
 
Weaker Party 
Little Aggression Moderate Aggression Intense Aggression 
Little Resistance 6, 14 3, 16 0, 18 
Moderate Resistance 7, 10 4, 12 1, 14 
Intense Resistance 8, 8 5, 10 2, 12  
 
One possible solution to external conflict and internal rent-seeking problems is to 
use a less resource-intensive method of “collective choice.” Alternative collective choice 
mechanisms do not generally eliminate all losses from conflict, but can reduce the cost of 
conflict by encouraging the use of more “civil” forms of social choice (Congleton 1980). 
Replacing “uncivil” with “civil” conflict tends to reduce the extent to which resources are 
consumed by changing the process of conflict, which can be an effective way to reduce 
losses. The king and council template can be used for this purpose, because it provides a 
broad range of possible divisions of authority. 
Similar gains from sharing authority can also arise when organizations or communi-
ties decide to merge their governments to realize economies of scale, diversify risks, or 
reduce transaction costs. In such cases, sharing policymaking authority allows the inter-
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ests of the merging organizations or communities to be protected against rent extraction 
by the other, while the additional joint output or reduced risks make governmental of-
ficeholders and residents better off. (Only the former is necessary for a voluntary ex-
change of authority to take place at the level of organizations or governments.) 
The king and council template allows policymaking authority to be divided between 
the king and parliament or among members of parliament (through weighted voting or 
special veto powers) in a manner that can approximately replicate the payoff ratios of the 
initial equilibrium, while reducing the extent of the resources consumed by conflict.  
 V.  The Evolutionary Possibilities of the King and Council Template 
The “market for power” provides an important mechanism through which govern-
ments based on a king and council can evolve. Such internal and external markets pro-
vide a self-interested explanation for changes in governance procedures. The distribution 
of policymaking authority and methods through which those in leadership posts are cho-
sen may be adjusted at any time as constitutional gains to trade emerge. Other existential 
crises, such as those created by threats of violence or natural disasters, can also induce 
revisions, as can improved knowledge about the performance of alternative institutional 
design.  
The king and council template, in turn, provides a large number of margins on which 
both constitutional exchange and experiments can take place. 
 A. Demand Shocks and Random Walks 
Such refinements of organizational governance are often intentional, although they 
are often induced by changes in circumstances beyond the control of the organization or 
its leadership. The market for authority implies that external shocks can affect organiza-
tional governance and the future policies through differential effects on willingness to pay 
for authority. For example, changes in the relative willingness to pay may arise through 
effects on theories used to forecast the effects of current policies and decisionmaking 
procedures and through changes in the underlying value of an organization’s services 
(Congleton 2007b, 2011).  
Such “demand shocks” may occur in a more or less uniformly distributed manner; in 
which case, policymaking authority would tend to follow a random walk, with the initial 
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point determined by the formeteur(s) and their objectives. If the distribution of authority 
does not affect the magnitude or variance of organizational surplus, a wide variety of or-
ganizational governments based on the king and council template would tend to emerge 
through time and be implemented in an approximately efficient organizational surplus–
maximizing manner. There would be proprietorships, partnerships, shareholder-
dominated firms, and cooperatives, all equally effective in advancing their organization’s 
objectives.  
 B. Survivorship Pressures 
However, if some objectives are more effectively advanced with some balances of 
authority and selection processes than others, both the governance menus confronted by 
formeteurs and the distribution of organizational governments that survive would be af-
fected by external demand and supply shocks.  
The typical form of government adopted in such cases would tend be that which was 
most appropriate for the enterprise. Rather than a random walk, in such cases, the bal-
ance of authority would tend to be clustered around the most efficient ones (from the 
perspective of formeteur interests), because both organizational surplus and survivorship 
would be affected by the relative effectiveness of organizational constitutions in the areas 
of interest. Convergence in governance institutions for similar activities would take place 
because of formeteur interests and survivorship pressures. 
 C. Advantages of Somewhat Flexible Institutions for Governance  
In cases in which survivorship pressures exist, amendment processes tend to become 
an important part of an organization’s constitutional design, because they affect the rate 
at which an organization’s government can be revised as circumstances change. A totally 
rigid design would require the founding of entirely new organizations to deal with new 
circumstances. A totally flexible form of government (a very easily amended one) would 
increase risks that changes in governance would undermine decisionmaking procedures, 
increasing errors and intraorganizational rent seeking. Constitutional bargains may be too 
difficult or too easy to make. 
 In such settings, robust templates for organizational governments would include 
more or less appropriate amendment procedures. Unfortunately, discovering the best 
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amendment procedure tends to take much more time than many other aspects of organ-
izational design, because the relative advantages of rapid or slow adjustments in deci-
sionmaking procedures requires exposure to a broad range of operating environments 
and shocks. Indeed, the best amendment procedures are likely to be conditional on the 
types and distributions of shocks confronted and so may need to be adjusted when major 
shifts in the stochastic operating environment occur.  
The fact that organizations can be too rigid to survive changes in operating environ-
ment suggests that the evolution of organizational governments favors somewhat adapt-
able structures, such as the king and council template, that can be adjusted at various 
margins. The fact that flexibility increases uncertainty and unproductive rent seeking sug-
gests that evolution also favors somewhat restrictive amendment procedures that limit 
the types of constitutional bargains that can take place. The balance between flexibility 
and predictability largely determines the optimal difficulty of amending an organization’s 
standing routines of governance. In the long run, the existing menu of amendment pro-
cedures would reflect past formeteur design experiments and organizational survivorship, 
as in other aspects of organizational design. 
 D. Difficulty of Observing the Evolution of Organizational Governance 
Shifts of authority have two kinds of effects. Shifts of authority may affect institu-
tionally induced interests, which often have relatively small effects on policy. The effects 
of such internal shifts in authority are often invisible to outsiders, because the effects of 
shifts in authority are often small and subtle. This is partly because maximizing the organ-
izational surplus is a common (institutionally induced) objective for an organization’s sen-
ior government officials. As a consequence, general policy decisions tend not to change 
very much as shifts of authority occur, except insofar as noninstitutional interests differ. 
For example, estimates of the relationships between policies and organizational surplus 
may differ somewhat, or there may be differences in risk aversion among office holders.  
Shifts of authority may also affect the non-institutional interests that affect policy de-
cisions though representational effects. The effects of shifts in authority between the king 
and the council are most evident when the king and the council represent different intra- 
or extra-organizational interests. In such cases, some policies become more likely to be 
adopted and others less so. For example, within a commercial enterprise, greater repre-
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sentation of shareholder interests on boards of directors may lead to higher dividends or 
lower salaries for organizational leaders. Greater representation of engineers may lead to 
higher capital investments, greater representation of marketing experts may induce larger 
investments in ad campaigns and product styling, and greater representation of labor in-
terests may produce shorter workdays or more holidays. Similarly, in natural or regional 
governments, changes in the balance of authority between the king and parliament may 
favor particular regions or interest groups. The king may favor colonial enterprises, and 
the parliament may favor infrastructure investments. It is largely because of such policy 
effects that authority is valued.  
Such representation effects can also be induced by changing the selection methods 
for leadership posts. For example, rules that require firms to include representatives from 
major shareholders or labor unions on their boards of directors will tend to change the 
debates within the board and may affect policy decisions on the margin, insofar as the 
new members produce new majority coalitions and/or their arguments affect board 
member expectations about the effects of alternative organizational policies. Similarly, 
different electoral rules in political systems tend to change the relative importance of sub-
sets of voters, for example, as the interests of male voters become relatively less impor-
tant and those of women more so when women’s suffrage is introduced. 
 VI. On the Relevance of the Analysis for Territorial Governance 
Congleton (2001, 2007b, 2011) suggests that the above models of organizational go-
vernance can be used to explain many of the common features of the organizations that 
ruled particular geographic territories (the other meaning of the word “government” in 
English) and also to explain why several such governments gradually became liberal de-
mocracies in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The evolutionary hypotheses de-
veloped in this paper can also be checked using the governments of Western Europe as 
organizational illustrations and data.  
Much of European history is consistent with the above analysis. The persons work-
ing for European territorial governments were normally carefully selected and motivated 
to advance organizational objectives using complex systems of reward, which were partly 
based on salary and prospects for promotion, but also on loyalty and reinforced by severe 
punishments for malfeasance. There were normally appeals to duties of various sorts 
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(family, god, and country), as well as salary. Contests for many high offices often induced 
the production of substantial services to the current generation of government leaders.  
“Rents” (organizational surplus) were largely concentrated in the accounts of gov-
ernmental leaders, rather than spread uniformly throughout their ruling organizations. 
This is evident in the homes of the leaders of most governments before 1800, who built 
monumental palaces, churches, and castles that continue to attract tourists worldwide to-
day. (The homes of “mere” foot soldiers and clerks rarely attract tourist interest.) In cases 
in which new polities were founded by a single military commander, the “king” normally 
had dominant policymaking authority. In governments founded as defense alliances, 
councils of various kinds often had dominant authority over public policy, as in the 
Dutch Republic, Switzerland, and United States. Free towns founded as commercial cen-
ters were often ruled by balanced king-and-council systems with a mayor and a town 
council.  
For much of European history, governance was based on the king and council tem-
plate and constitutional gains to trade occasionally arose among the branches of govern-
ment. Most kings had both royal councils and parliaments. Most republics had governors 
or mayors as well as representative assemblies. Policymaking authority shifted repeatedly 
from the kings to parliaments and from parliaments to kings, often without obvious 
threats of violence or revolution, and often without obvious trends. Most individual 
shifts were relatively minor ones, but a wide variety of distributions of authority was ob-
served over the course of the Middle Ages and early modern period. 
During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a new trend in both demand and 
supply shocks emerged. These technological and ideological shocks tended to favor 
councils (parliaments) over their kings in constitutional negotiations. Supply shocks also 
occurred that made kings more willing to trade authority for additional parliamentary 
subsidies (new tax revenues), because the cost of governance and warfare had increased. 
Parliaments, thus, gradually traded new tax revenues directly or indirectly for greater au-
thority over policy. The same shocks also helped induce changes in the manner in which 
government leaders were chosen, although through a somewhat different mechanism. 
Elections became increasingly broadly based and competitive. Seats were shifted to new 
regions of the country where industrial organizations emerged.  
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Over the course of a century of such constitutional bargaining, “new” forms of gov-
ernment emerged. The templates of these new governments were often grounded in gov-
ernance architectures that were centuries old (multi-cameral parliaments, kings, and cabi-
nets), but the leaders of the new governments increasingly held their positions as a con-
sequence of elections based on adult suffrage and parliaments became the main locus of 
policymaking authority. That the new distribution of authority reflected bargaining, rather 
than revolution, was also clearly evident. Many European kings and queens retained their 
offices as “heads of state,” albeit with very limited policymaking authority, and most con-
tinued to live opulent lives. 
Gains from constitutional exchange within the king and council template had al-
lowed a new form of government to emerge (parliamentary democracy), without the need 
for great revolutions or revolutionary shifts in the basic template for governance.8  
VII. Conclusions: On the Form, Basis, Limits, and Evolution of Organizational 
Governments 
This paper has developed a general framework for analyzing the evolution of organ-
izational governance. It makes several general predictions about the kinds of institutions 
and institutional adjustments that can be observed in practice. To survive, all organiza-
tions must solve a variety of organizational problems. They have to recruit and motivate 
teams and advance objectives in a manner that is “self-financing.” They have to be able 
to adjust both their methods and objectives as circumstances. 
The common interests and problems of formeteurs imply that the templates for organiza-
tional governance share a number of properties, a subset of which have been identified and ana-
lyzed in this paper. Every durable organization will have a body of internal procedures for mak-
ing policy decisions that serve as its charter or constitution for governance. The standing rules 
normally specify the officeholders who participate in major decisions and the manner in which 
those officials interact to make decisions, as with voting and appointment rules. The latter may 
include specific architectures for policymaking that group and/or assign tasks to subsets of of-
ficeholders. The standing procedures of long-lived organizations also include rules governing the 
                                              
8Congleton (2011) provides much more theoretical and historical detail than can be provided in this 
section of the paper. For those interested in more complete analyses and histories of the evolution of 
territorial governance in Europe, North America, and Japan, see chapters 5–18 of that volume. 
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selection and succession of officeholders, and standing procedures for modifying the organiza-
tion’s charter. 
The governmental templates that attract formeteur interests will tend to collect and use in-
formation relatively efficiently and to produce decisions that increase the viability of their or-
ganization, while advancing their organizational interests. Improvements from the point of for-
meteurs tends to concentrate organizational surplus in the hands of governmental leaders, be-
cause this is often the goal of formeteurs.  
 A.  Organizational Templates Reflect Formeteur Interests 
The founding charters (constitutions) of organizations always favor formeteur interests, be-
cause formeteurs draft their organization’s founding documents. This founding role also implies 
that evolution favors organizational templates that concentrate organizational surplus in the 
hands of formeteurs and their successors, because only templates that attract sufficient interest 
from past formeteurs remain on the organizational menu.  
That the evolution of organizational structures tends to favor formeteurs, rather than em-
ployees or shareholders, provides an explanation for the reward structures of many large con-
temporary economic enterprises in which senior executives (the enterprises’ government) realize 
very high salaries relative to other team members. Similar reward structures have often been as-
sociated with territorial governments and religious organizations. Even in contemporary democ-
racies, the expression “lives like a king” has a clear meaning. 
The interests of formeteurs and the requirements of team production also explain why most 
organizations use mixed forms of conditional incentives to solve team production problems and 
why both internal incentive systems and organizational policy tend to be somewhat flexible at 
the margin, although core policies tend to be fundamentally stable and similar among organiza-
tions. An organization’s system of governance and its reward system tend to be stable, because 
organizations tend to make better decisions and are better able to retain and train their teams 
when they have “institutionalized” their reward and governance systems. 
Formeteur interests imply that one man or one woman is unlikely to govern alone, even 
when a single person founds the organization. In all but the smallest of organizations, the “king 
and council template” for governance is likely to be used for choosing and refining policies, be-
cause it addresses a variety of short-, medium-, and long-term governance problems. King and 
council–based governments address short-term informational problems, can be “finely tuned” to 
take advantage of new circumstances, and can be used to realize constitutional gains to trade, 
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without changing the fundamental architecture of the organization’s government. They also pro-
vides several natural solutions to problems of succession and power sharing. 
 B.  Rational Institutional Conservatism 
Although the existence of an organizational government potentially allows organizations to 
change policies at every instant and the existence of amendment procedures potentially allows 
organizations to reinvent their procedures for governance every day, durable organizations will 
not do so. There are good reasons for organizational governments to prefer stability to innova-
tion in both the routines of ordinary team production and governance. Such rational institutional 
conservatism is supported by the risk aversion of government officeholders and team members, 
and various economic advantages associated with being “conventional.” As a consequence, both 
succession and amendment procedures tend to encourage governance stability and continuity.  
As in other aspects of organizational design, formeteurs choose their organization’s formal 
amendment procedures with their own interests in mind.  
Most will acknowledge their limits as institutional designers and so will include provisions 
for revising their standing procedures of governance as problems and opportunities are recog-
nized. Insofar as small reforms are easier to assess and implement than large reforms, the 
amendment procedures adopted will tend to favor piece-meal reforms that address particular 
problems, rather than “reinventing” the entire organization. Such modest reforms preserve ad-
vantages associated with stable procedures and help to avoid unforeseen costs generated by ex-
perimental failures. They also increase the predictability of reward and recruiting systems, which 
tends to reduce the cost of those systems and increase organizational surpluses.  
Nonetheless, gains from experimentation and constitutional exchange do emerge from time 
to time, and the amendment procedures that allow such gains to be realized tend to produce 
more robust organizations in the long run. Shifts in the long-term interests of organizational 
leaders and technologies of production have to be accounted for, and adjustments to a variety of 
standing procedures of governance may be required to take advantage of new more or less per-
manent conditions. 
 C. The King and Council Template Facilitates Both Evolution and the Analysis 
of Organizational Governance 
For the purposes of developing models of organizational governance, the widespread use of 
a single flexible template for governance is a fortunate consequence, because it also allows a 
broad range of organizations to be analyzed with a single model or conceptual framework. The 
theory of organizations proposed above implies that the king and council framework and most 
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short- and long-term reforms of it are consequences of decisions made by organizational leaders. 
This allows the effects of interests and stochastic shocks to be analyzed in the short, medium, 
and long run, using models grounded in methodological individualism, as sketched out in the last 
few sections of this paper.  
The king and council model also allows a large number of government types, from dictator-
ships to aristocracies to democracies, to be represented within a single conceptual framework.  
The many continua of potential reforms imply that both extreme and intermediate forms of gov-
ernance can emerge incrementally from the others through a series of reforms. This allows evo-
lutionary research strategies to be used to explain the distribution of governance forms observed 
in particular types of organizations and in particular industries and to predict those that are likely 
to emerge as circumstances change. 
The same flexibility that makes the king and council template a practical, robust template for 
organizational governance also allows the king and council model to be used as the basis for 
general analyses of organizational governance, reform, and evolution. This paper has begun that 
analysis, although much more remains to be done.  
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